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In this article, the authors evaluate the 
cost and utilization effects of the SELECT 
implementations in 11 States. In particu-
lar they compare the before-and-after enroll-
ment experiences of Medicare beneficiaries 
newly enrolled in SELECT plans with the 
experiences of those newly enrolled in tradi-
tional medigap plans. Using Medicare 
claims data for 1991 through 1994, the 
authors find that Medicare SELECT 
increased costs in five States, decreased 
costs in three States, and had no effect in 
three States. Cost increases were generally 
related to Part B utilization. 
INTRODUCTION 
Medicare SELECT is an individually pur-
chased Medicare supplemental insurance 
policy that requires beneficiaries to use the 
insurer's provider network (to the extent 
that a network exists) to receive supple-
mental benefits. Medicare benefits are 
unaffected by whether the beneficiary 
uses the supplemental insurer's network 
(and receives supplemental benefits) or 
goes outside the network (and forfeits sup-
plemental benefits). In creating SELECT 
Congress expected that it would direct 
beneficiaries to networks of efficient 
providers established by the supplemental 
insurers. This would in turn reduce fee-for-
service (FFS) Medicare claims and enable 
SELECT insurers to offer beneficiaries 
lower premiums. In this article we present 
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an evaluation of the impact of 
SELECT (during the January 1, 1992— 
December 31, 1994 demonstration period) 
on Medicare program costs and beneficia-
ry utilization in 11 States. The impact of 
SELECT on supplemental insurance 
premiums and beneficiary access and 
satisfaction is addressed elsewhere 
(Garfinkel et al., 1996). 
Medicare SELECT is one of several 
attempts to introduce managed care incen-
tives into the FFS Medicare system. 
Although enrollment in Medicare health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) has 
grown rapidly in recent years, it still repre-
sents only 13 percent of the Medicare pop-
ulation and may continue to represent a 
minority of the Medicare population for the 
foreseeable future. Thus, the growth of 
expenditures in the FFS Medicare system 
will continue to be a key factor in the finan-
cial health of the Medicare program. This 
evaluation not only bears on the extent to 
which SELECT has achieved its cost-con-
tainment objectives but also contributes to 
the growing body of information about the 
prospects for managed care techniques as 
a way to reduce the long-term growth in 
Medicare program expenditures. 
BACKGROUND 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA) of 1990 made two important 
changes in the regulation of Medicare sup-
plemental insurance. First, the law imposed 
mandatory standards for individually pur-
chased medigap insurance. These stan-
dards, which took effect in 1992, limited 
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medigap policies to 10 standard plans, 
labeled A through J, and guaranteed issue 
for Medicare beneficiaries within 6 months 
of eligibility for Medicare Part B. Second, 
OBRA 1990 allowed medigap insurers in 15 
States to market network-based medigap 
products, called Medicare SELECT poli-
cies, on a 3-year demonstration basis. 
SELECT products offer a managed care 
alternative to traditional medigap insur-
ance. In most instances the SELECT bene-
fits are the same as standard medigap 
plans.1 Like an HMO, however, SELECT 
plans pay supplemental benefits only when 
contracting network providers are used. 
Because Medicare SELECT plans are sup-
plemental policies, they have no effect on 
Medicare program payments. The FFS 
Medicare program makes its payments 
whether or not services are delivered in or 
out of the SELECT network. Thus, from the 
beneficiary's perspective, SELECT plans 
function like a preferred provider organiza-
tion (PPO) in that, when out-of-network 
providers are used, most of the cost (i.e., 
the Medicare program's obligation) is still 
covered, but some of the cost (i.e., the sup-
plemental insurer's obligation) is not. 
The 15 States initially designated as 
SELECT States are Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington, 
and Wisconsin. Oregon and Michigan, 
however, quickly withdrew because of a 
lack of insurer interest and, in mid-1993, 
Illinois and Massachusetts were selected 
as replacements. 
Although the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) was responsible 
for supervising the SELECT program, 
actual implementation was the responsibil-
1 Because they already had standardized medigap plans, three 
SELECT States (Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) 
were not required to implement the OBRA 1990 standardization. 
In these States SELECT insurers were permitted to market 
plans that corresponded to their existing State-specific medigap 
plans. 
ity of the department of insurance in 
each State. Within the guidelines of the 
National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners' (NAIC) model legislation, 
each State implemented SELECT accord-
ing to its own insurance regulations, proce-
dures, and standards. Moreover, the State-
specific implementations were substantial-
ly shaped by the insurers themselves, who 
were required to seek approval from the 
State departments of insurance before 
marketing a SELECT product. In our case 
studies of the State implementations, we 
found considerable variation across States 
in how SELECT was implemented (Lubalin 
et al., 1994). 
The original 3-year demonstration, which 
had been scheduled to end December 31, 
1994, was extended to June 30, 1995, by the 
Social Security Amendments of 1994 
(Public Law 103-432). In late June 1995, 
Congress expanded the authority to offer 
Medicare SELECT plans to all States 
(Public Law 104-18). SELECT was extended 
until June 30, 1998, at which time it will 
become permanent, unless the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services finds that it (1) 
has not resulted in savings of premium 
costs to beneficiaries, compared with non-
SELECT medigap policies; (2) has resulted 
in significant additional expenditures for the 
Medicare program; or (3) has resulted in 
diminished access and quality of care. 
EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
In authorizing this demonstration, legis-
lators had anticipated that Medicare 
SELECT products would (1) reduce Medi-
care program expenditures by directing 
beneficiaries to efficient provider networks 
established by medigap insurers; (2) 
reduce beneficiary expenditures for medi-
gap coverage, because insurers would pass 
the savings from provider efficiencies on to 
beneficiaries through lower premiums; 
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and (3) achieve these savings without com-
promising quality of care. Our evaluation 
was designed to answer these questions, in 
addition to providing basic descriptive 
information about how SELECT was 
implemented by States and insurers. 
In this article we address the question 
of how SELECT has affected Medicare 
program expenditures and utilization. 
However, it is useful to first summarize the 
prevalence of SELECT offerings and 
enrollment and their impact on beneficia-
ries to provide the context to understand 
SELECT's impact on Medicare program costs. 
SELECT Implementation 
A summary of SELECT participation by 
States, insurers, and beneficiaries is pro-
vided in Table 1. One year after SELECT 
was approved for implementation nation-
wide, 20 States had approved SELECT poli-
cies. Massachusetts remains the only one 
among the 15 demonstration States with-
out an approved policy. Since the nation-
wide expansion, six States that did not par-
ticipate in the demonstration have 
approved SELECT policies: Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and 
Wyoming.2 There were 121 insurers 
approved to offer SELECT products in the 
20 States, counting each insurer approved 
in each State as a separate observation. Of 
the 121 insurers, 79 were commercial com-
panies, 16 were Blue Cross Blue Shield 
(BCBS) affiliates, and 25 were HMOs. 
These plans had enrolled approximately 
571,000 Medicare beneficiaries by July 1, 
1996, about 2.7 percent of the 22.2 million 
Medicare beneficiaries in those States. The 
participating BCBS affiliates accounted for 
74 percent of enrollment, with BCBS of 
Alabama, BCBS of Minnesota, and Blue 
Cross of California alone accounting for 58 
2 Insurance departments and insurers reported that SELECT 
applications were under consideration in 15 additional States. 
percent. Throughout the original 3-year 
demonstration and the ensuing 18 months 
of SELECT activity, BCBS affiliates consis-
tently accounted for three-fourths of all 
SELECT enrollment, despite the fact that a 
larger number of commercial insurance 
companies and HMOs were participating. 
The most interesting aspect of SELECT 
implementation, and the one with the 
greatest implications for program impact, 
is the decision made by many insurers to 
either use hospital-only provider networks 
or include almost all physicians and hospi-
tals in the State. Of the 121 companies 
offering SELECT in 1996, 86 (71 percent) 
had hospital-only networks. This includes 
77 of the 79 (97 percent) commercial insur-
ance companies offering SELECT plans. 
Insurers adopted this model because (1) 
they believed that the only significant sav-
ings to be found in the SELECT program 
would come from discounts or waivers of 
the Medicare Part A deductible by hospi-
tals; (2) the transaction cost of establishing 
physician networks is high; and (3) HCFA 
has approved a "safe harbor" for discounts 
on the Part A deductible but not for Part B 
coinsurance (Lubalin et al., 1994). 
Effects on Beneficiaries 
We considered the effects of SELECT on 
Medicare beneficiaries in terms of the 
medigap premiums they face and their 
experiences with SELECT coverage. 
Because premiums vary according to the 
insurer's claims experience and actuarial 
judgment, benefit package (e.g., A-J), and 
ratesetting method (e.g., attained age, 
issue age, or community rating), it was 
important to make comparisons within 
company and plan type for those compa-
nies that offered the same plans as 
SELECT and standard medigap policies. 
We computed ratios of 1996 SELECT to 
standard medigap premiums for non-smok-
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ing women of ages 65 years and 75 years 
and found that SELECT premiums were 
less expensive on average than the premi-
ums for the standard medigap versions for 
the same policies offered by the same com-
panies. The differences ranged from 15-29 
percent at age 65 and 11-29 percent at age 
75, depending on type of plan. Such differ-
ences could be attributable to the use of 
efficient physicians by insurers who use 
selective physician networks but almost 
certainly derives substantially from the dis-
counts or waivers of the Part A deductible 
by network hospitals. However, these dif-
ferences could also reflect favorable selec-
tion in Medicare SELECT, an issue 
addressed later in our analysis of Medicare 
program costs. 
It is important to note, however, that 
there are often policies available that have 
lower premiums than the standard policy 
offered by the SELECT insurer. Thus, new 
Medicare beneficiaries, who are guaran-
teed issue for their first 6 months of Part B 
eligibility, can often obtain a policy that is 
less expensive than the SELECT policy. 
Clearly SELECT is not producing the least 
expensive policies in the market, and price 
is not the sole factor in the choice of medi-
gap policy. 
From our survey of Medicare beneficia-
ries, we compared those who had pur-
chased SELECT policies with those who 
had standard medigap policies. We found 
that persons of races other than white and 
persons in low socioeconomic groups were 
more likely to purchase a SELECT product 
than were white persons and wealthier, 
better educated beneficiaries. This is con-
sistent with the finding that SELECT pre-
miums are comparatively inexpensive for 
beneficiaries 65 years of age. We also 
found no difference in health status 
between the two groups, which suggests 
that selection bias is less likely as an expla-
nation for cost differences. 
Finally, we found no difference in satis-
faction with medigap insurance between 
purchasers of SELECT and standard unre-
stricted products. If beneficiaries who pur-
chase SELECT, presumably to obtain lower 
premiums, were less satisfied than the com-
parison group, then one might conclude 
that buying SELECT is a "bad" bargain. 
However, the evidence suggests that the 
two groups are equally satisfied and that, 
holding all else constant, SELECT is a rea-
sonable choice for beneficiaries who are 
willing to accept some restriction in choice 
of provider to obtain a lower premium. 
ANALYTIC APPROACH 
In evaluating SELECT effects on 
Medicare program cost and utilization, we 
use a "four-way" quasi-experimental 
design, comparing the before-and-after 
enrollment experiences of Medicare bene-
ficiaries newly enrolled in SELECT plans 
with the before-and-after enrollment expe-
riences of a matched sample of Medicare 
beneficiaries newly enrolled in traditional 
post-OBRA medigap plans 
The study population included benefi-
ciaries who were enrolled in either 
SELECT or post-OBRA standard medigap 
plans in February 1994. Twenty-four of 26 
SELECT insurers supplied the Medicare 
identification numbers of beneficiaries 
who had purchased their SELECT and 
standard medigap plans. In addition, 
several BCBS affiliates that did not 
offer SELECT plans and the Pru-
dential/American Association of Retired 
Persons medigap plan submitted identifi-
cation numbers of standard plan pur-
chasers to expand the pool of potential 
comparison group members. All identifi-
cation numbers that could be matched to 
the Medicare eligibility file were eligible 
for the study. We were able to match 81 
percent of the SELECT identification 
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numbers in the 12 States with SELECT 
enrollment in February 1994. 
All eligible SELECT beneficiaries were 
included in the analysis. The comparison 
group was constructed by selecting a strat-
ified random sample of the eligible stan-
dard plan purchasers matched to the age, 
sex, and ZIP Code distribution of the eligi-
ble SELECT population. 
We then evaluated the effects of SELECT 
on 14 different measures of cost and uti-
lization. Although we report results for all 
measures, we focus on our most compre-
hensive cost measure, total allowable 
Medicare expense (including deductibles 
and copayments). Thus, the greatest atten-
tion is given to answering the principal pol-
icy question, namely, does SELECT reduce 
total Medicare costs? 
We estimated the cost models as log-linear 
relationships, and we estimated the utiliza-
tion models as linear relationships. We found 
that this approach gave the most robust esti-
mates across different model types and dif-
ferent dependent variables. All models were 
estimated separately for each State. 
Fixed-Effects Model 
Preliminary analyses using a simple 
cross-section/time-series design indicated 
potential selection bias. Specification tests 
showed significant differences in the 
Medicare costs incurred prior to enroll-
ment in the current medigap plan, even 
after controlling for observable character-
istics (Heckman and Hotz, 1989). In an 
effort to mitigate selection bias, we used 
the fixed-effects procedure in estimating 
SELECT effects. Fixed-effects is the stan-
dard econometric procedure for avoiding 
or reducing selection bias. It controls com-
pletely for time-invariant differences 
among individuals. 
In estimating the fixed-effects models, 
we estimated a unique intercept for each 
individual beneficiary. Although this proce-
dure controls for all measured and unmea-
sured person-specific characteristics, it 
also means that all time-invariant variables 
(e.g., sex, race, location, and reason for 
entitlement) are excluded from the estima-
tion and cannot be included as explicit con-
trol variables. Indeed, this is the major lim-
itation of fixed-effects estimation—that one 
cannot ascertain the role or importance of 
time-invariant covariates. For this reason 
we also estimated cross-section/time-series 
models without using fixed effects. We nev-
ertheless believe that the fixed-effects esti-
mation provides the more robust and reli-
able estimates of SELECT effects. It pro-
vides the strongest control for self-selection 
or specification bias as an alternative expla-
nation for observed cost differences. 
The fixed-effects models include only 
the variables that vary over time. In partic-
ular, the fixed-effects models include three 
key variables: SELECT (indicating 
SELECT program effects), MEDIGAP 
(indicating traditional medigap effects), 
and QUARTER. SELECT is the treatment 
variable, with a range from zero to one. For 
SELECT enrollees, it is set equal to zero 
for quarters prior to SELECT enrollment. 
It is set equal to one for quarters after 
SELECT enrollment 
For the quarter in which SELECT enroll-
ment occurred, SELECT is defined propor-
tionately (e.g., set equal to 0.50 if enrollment 
occurred midway through a quarter). For 
non-SELECT enrollees this SELECT vari-
able is always zero. This variable is our indi-
cator of the SELECT program effect. 
To distinguish pre-enrollment quarters 
from post-enrollment quarters, we used 
another dummy variable designated MEDI-
GAP. For all beneficiaries this variable is set 
equal to zero for quarters prior to enroll-
ment in a post-OBRA medigap product. It is 
set equal to one for quarters after such 
enrollment. For SELECT enrollees only, the 
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SELECT and MEDIGAP variables have the 
same values. Thus, the MEDIGAP variable 
controls for or distinguishes the effect of 
enrollment in any post-OBRA medigap 
product, traditional or SELECT, and the 
SELECT variable distinguishes the incre-
mental or differential effect of enrollment in 
a SELECT product. Thus, for SELECT 
enrollees, the effects are additive. 
We also included a variable, QUARTER, 
to account for time-trend effects. QUAR-
TER takes a value ranging from 1 through 
16, depending on which of the 16 quarters 
in our data set is represented by the obser-
vation. Finally, three dummy variables are 
used to control for seasonal variation in 
health care use, with winter being the 
omitted category. 
Cross-Section/Time-Series Model 
This model includes not only the vari-
ables included in the fixed-effects model 
but also a number of time-invariant benefi-
ciary characteristics. A dummy variable 
(EVER) identifies those ever enrolled in a 
SELECT product. This variable distin-
guishes the SELECT group from the com-
parison group and controls for prior-use 
differences between the SELECT and non-
SELECT beneficiaries. In essence, EVER 
distinguishes the experimental group from 
the comparison group, MEDIGAP distin-
guishes pre-enrollment quarters from post-
enrollment quarters, and SELECT repre-
sents the interaction of the two. Of course 
we could not include EVER in the fixed-
effects model because it does not vary over 
time. 
A number of beneficiary demographic 
characteristics were also included as inde-
pendent variables in the cross-
section/time-series estimation to control 
explicitly for health status and other indi-
vidual differences between the SELECT 
and comparison beneficiaries.3 Finally, to 
control for geographic variation in provider 
availability and payment rates, we included 
dummy variables identifying county of ben-
eficiary residence; and to control for insur-
er differences in risk selection, we includ-
ed dummy variables distinguishing the var-
ious SELECT and non-SELECT insurers. 
Whereas the cross-section/time-series 
model specification is reasonably compre-
hensive, it is nevertheless important to 
acknowledge that this basic cross-sec-
tion/time-series model and all other mod-
els estimated were incompletely specified. 
In particular, we had no information on the 
beneficiaries' prior supplemental insurance 
status. We did not know whether a given 
beneficiary had another medigap product 
during the time interval prior to reported 
enrollment in a post-OBRA traditional or 
SELECT product. As a practical necessity, 
our analysis must assume that the tradi-
tional and SELECT enrollee populations 
had the same distribution of supplemental 
benefits prior to post-OBRA enrollment. To 
the extent that this assumption is incorrect, 
our estimates of the medigap and SELECT 
impacts could reflect bias. 
If, for example, SELECT (because of 
price advantage or market positioning) 
were relatively more attractive to Medicare 
beneficiaries without a prior supplemental 
plan, our estimates of the SELECT effects 
could have a positive bias. Health services 
research has consistently shown that bene-
ficiaries with supplemental insurance have 
higher Medicare costs than those without 
(Christenson, Long, and Rodgers, 1987; 
3 The beneficiary variables are as follows: six continuous vari-
ables (AGE65, AGE70, AGE75, AGE80, AGE85, and AGEGT85), 
specifying age in a piecewise linear fashion, a dummy variable 
(FEMALE) identifying those who are female, a dummy variable 
(BLACK) identifying those who are black, and a dummy variable 
(OTHER) identifying those who are of races other than black or 
white. To control for the beneficiary's Medicare eligibility sta-
tus, which is associated with health status by definition: a 
dummy variable (DISABLED), identifying those who are dis-
abled, a dummy variable (RENAL), identifying those with renal 
disease, a dummy variable (AGED_DIS), identifying those who 
are aged and disabled, and a dummy variable (AGED_REN), 
identifying those who are both aged and have renal disease. 
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Link, Long, and Settle, 1980; McCall et al, 
1991; and Khandker and McCormack, 
1996). Indeed, our own results provide 
additional, strong support for that propo-
sition. If so, a cost-increasing result 
would be obtained if those enrolling in 
SELECT had been less likely to have a 
supplemental plan prior to post-OBRA 
enrollment. 
Unfortunately, no comparative informa-
tion was available on the prior insurance sta-
tus of the SELECT and comparison benefi-
ciaries. However, we believe that the 
potential for such selection bias is much 
diminished in those States with very large 
SELECT enrollment (e.g., Alabama, 
California, and Minnesota). Their SELECT 
populations are much more likely to be 
representative of the larger Medicare 
beneficiary universe in those States. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as our findings for 
these three States mirror the pattern of 
results for all States in which SELECT is 
evaluated, we do not believe that the differ-
ences seen are wholly or even substantially 
attributable to such selection bias. 
Other Models 
In addition to the fixed-effects and 
cross-section/time-series models, we 
estimated other models to check the 
robustness of our results. We estimated 
an expanded fixed-effects model that also 
included the time-invariant covariates 
(e.g., gender and race). We estimated a 
prior-use model in which the dependent 
variable in the last year of our data was 
modeled as a function of the baseline 
value of the dependent variable in the 
first year of our data, in addition to other 
factors. We also estimated a first-differ-
ence model wherein the dependent vari-
able was constructed as the difference 
between experience in the first and last 
years of our data. 
These models, with the possible excep-
tion of the first-difference model, yielded 
results that are broadly consistent with the 
fixed-effects model and indicate similar 
appraisal of the SELECT program. 
However, none of these models is as theo-
retically appealing or empirically robust as 
the fixed-effects model. The fixed-effects 
model reported herein clearly provides the 
best estimate of SELECT program effects. 
The fixed-effect results are more stable 
than the results obtained with other mod-
els; they permit inferences to the more 
inclusive and representative of the refer-
ence population; and they provide the 
strongest control for selection bias and 
specification bias as alternative explana-
tions. Thus, we focus on those results. 
DATA 
Our analyses were limited to the 11 
States with sufficient SELECT enrollment 
in February 1994. Illinois, Massachusetts, 
and Washington were excluded from 
analysis because they did not have 
SELECT enrollment at that time, and 
North Dakota was excluded because the 
sample size available in that State was too 
small to permit reliable estimation 
For both the SELECT and comparison 
groups, we obtained all Medicare claims, 
Part A and Part B, for services provided 
during the 4-year interval, 1991 through 
1994. The utilization and cost experience 
was then summarized by beneficiary for 
each of the 16 quarters in that interval. 
Thus, our data include a maximum of 16 
observations for each beneficiary. 
Moreover, for each beneficiary, our data 
include only those quarters for which the 
beneficiary was alive, continuously eligible 
for Medicare (both Parts A and B), and not 
enrolled in an HMO. 
The number of beneficiaries enrolled in 
SELECT ranged from 400-500 in Indiana 
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Table 2 
SELECT and Non-SELECT Sample Sizes: Numbers of Beneficiaries and Average 
Number of Quarters, by State: February 1994 
State 
Total 
Alabama 
Arizona 
California 
Florida 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Texas 
Wisconsin 
SELECT Sample 
Average 
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
138,487 
30,793 
1,189 
38,683 
12,393 
523 
13,402 
25,533 
4,656 
425 
8,551 
2,339 
Average 
Number 
of Quarters 
— 
11.64 
13.03 
12.49 
13.23 
12.21 
12.20 
12.01 
13.17 
12.50 
13.59 
10.61 
Non-SELECT Sample 
Number of 
Beneficiaries 
69,686 
4,367 
1,152 
31,416 
12,145 
450 
4,905 
3,410 
3,984 
499 
5,663 
1,695 
Number 
of Quarters 
— 
13.08 
13.66 
12.40 
13.53 
13.41 
12.71 
13.94 
12.75 
11.96 
13.73 
12.19 
SOURCE: SELECT and non-SELECT insurer eligibility files, February 1994. 
and Ohio to more than 25,000 in Alabama, 
California, and Minnesota (Table 2). The 
sample includes only beneficiaries newly 
enrolled in SELECT products. Rollovers 
from pre-OBRA network-based medigap 
products were excluded so that the pre-
SELECT period did not represent enroll-
ment in a similar network-based medigap 
product. In each State we sought to have an 
approximately equal number of non-
SELECT comparison beneficiaries.4 
However, the number of non-SELECT bene-
ficiaries in Alabama, Kentucky, and 
Minnesota is substantially less than the 
number of SELECT beneficiaries (Table 2, 
third column) because the sampling frame 
did not include a sufficient number of newly 
enrolled non-SELECT beneficiaries to 
match the newly enrolled SELECT uni-
verse. Such imbalances reduce the precision 
in estimating the SELECT effects but do not 
bias or otherwise invalidate the 
findings. The average number of quarterly 
4 We drew a stratified random sample that matched the age, sex, 
and geographic distribution of the SELECT population. This 
was achieved by stratifying by age, sex, and three-digit ZIP Code 
and drawing a sample equal to the SELECT count in each stra-
tum. If the SELECT count exceeded the number of cases avail-
able in the comparison group stratum, then every stratum mem-
ber was selected. 
observations per beneficiary ranged from 
10.6 to 13.6 for the SELECT sample, and 
from 12.0 to 13.7 for the comparison group. 
There are several reasons for having fewer 
than 16 quarters of data. First, the enroll-
ment in post-OBRA products is weighted 
toward those newly eligible for Medicare 
(i.e., those just reaching age 65), and natu-
rally no claims data are available for times 
prior to first date of Medicare eligibility. 
Second, for Medicare beneficiaries previ-
ously enrolled in an HMO, the Medicare 
program collects no utilization and cost 
information for the interval of HMO enroll-
ment. In several States (e.g., Wisconsin 
and Indiana), a substantial proportion of 
SELECT enrollees were formerly enrolled 
in an HMO. Third, a small number of bene-
ficiaries died during the 16-quarter period. 
RESULTS 
Total Cost Per Beneficiary 
Our results show that the effect of 
SELECT varies widely across States (Table 
3). Significant, positive (cost-increasing) 
estimates are obtained for five States— 
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Table 3 
Estimated SELECT Impacts on Medicare Program Costs, 
Using the Fixed-Effects Model, by State: 1991-94 
State 
Alabama 
Arizona 
California 
Florida 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Texas 
Wisconsin 
Average 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
**0.152 
**0.140 
**-0.086 
-0.029 
**0.378 
0.008 
0.009 
**-0.109 
*-0.209 
**0.076 
**0.137 
NA 
Standard 
Error 
0.023 
0.053 
0.011 
0.016 
0.091 
0.024 
0.037 
0.030 
0.090 
0.023 
0.050 
— 
Estimated 
Effect 
(in Percent) 
16.4 
15.0 
-8.2 
-2.9 
45.9 
0.8 
0.9 
-10.3 
-18.9 
7.9 
14.7 
5.6 
95-Percent 
Confidence 
Level 
11.2, 22.7 
3.1, 27.0 
-10.2, -6.3 
NS 
19.9, 72.0 
NS 
NS 
-15.6, -5.0 
-33.2, -4.6 
3.0, 12.8 
3.4, 25.9 
2.3, 8.9 
* Significant at 0.05 level. 
** Significant at 0.01 level. 
NOTES: NA = not applicable. NS = not significant. A positive sign indicates that SELECT increases Medicare costs; a negative sign indicates that 
SELECT decreases Medicare costs. 
SOURCE: Analysis of Medicare Part A and Part B claims data, 1991-94. 
Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Texas, and 
Wisconsin; and significant, negative (cost-
decreasing) estimates are obtained for 
three States—California, Missouri, and 
Ohio. The significant, positive effects range 
from a low of 7.9 percent in Texas to a high 
of 45.9 percent in Indiana; and the signifi-
cant, negative effects range from -18.9 per-
cent in Ohio to -8.2 percent in California. 
The simple average of all 11 State-specif-
ic estimates is +5.6 percent. This estimated 
average effect is significant at the 0.01 
level, and the 95-percent confidence inter-
val ranges from +2.3 percent to +8.9 per-
cent. Excluding Indiana and Ohio, the two 
States with the smallest sample sizes and 
most extreme values, the simple average of 
the remaining estimates is +3.8 percent. 
This estimate is also significantly greater 
than zero at the 0.01 level. Its 95-percent 
confidence interval ranges from +1.5 per-
cent to +6.1 percent. 
Weighted averages have not been devel-
oped, because we do not believe that it is 
appropriate to do so. Our State-specific 
sample sizes do not fairly reflect differ-
ences in SELECT market potential across 
States. The State-to-State differences in 
SELECT enrollment in our samples are 
substantially the result of differences in 
insurer marketing strategy and State 
insurance department regulatory policy 
rather than a reflection of the impact of 
SELECT managed care provisions. 
Moreover the SELECT implementations 
varied considerably across States 
(Lubalin et al., 1994). Because we view the 
11 State implementations as 11 indepen-
dent tests of the SELECT concept, the 
simple average is the more relevant sum-
mary statistic. 
Any summary statistic that averages 
the results for States, including our sim-
ple arithmetic average, should neverthe-
less be used cautiously because the 
effects vary so much across States. In par-
ticular, a simple average of program 
effects should not be construed as an esti-
mate of the national effect of the SELECT 
program. The SELECT States were not 
constructed as a representative sample of 
States or Medicare beneficiaries, and we 
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have no way of anticipating how other 
States would implement SELECT. 
Medigap Estimate 
We included a medigap program vari-
able to control for supplemental insurance 
effects other than SELECT. The coefficient 
of the MEDIGAP variable indicates the 
effect of enrollment in a post-OBRA tradi-
tional supplement (Table 4). We obtain 
positive (cost-increasing) estimates for all 
11 States, and all but two are significant. The 
estimates range from +7.4 percent to +29.6 
percent, and the average is +19.0 percent. 
This average is significant at the 0.01 level, 
and the 95-percent confidence interval 
ranges from 15.8 percent to 22.7 percent. 
Our results for the MEDIGAP variable 
reconfirm and support findings from other 
studies that have consistently found sup-
plemental insurance to be associated with 
increased Medicare utilization and costs. 
We included the MEDIGAP variable to 
control for this effect. Clearly, if we had not 
done so, our estimates of the SELECT 
effects would have been biased upward 
substantially. The estimates for the 
SELECT impacts are incremental or addi-
tive to the MEDIGAP impacts. 
Full Model Results—An Illustrative 
Example 
For illustrative purposes we report full 
results for California, for both the fixed-
effects and cross-section/time-series mod-
els (Table 5). Both models indicate that 
the Medicare costs vary significantly with 
the QUARTER time-trend variable. Also 
both indicate that costs are significantly 
higher in the spring quarter (relative to 
winter.) The fixed-effects model addition-
ally finds that the costs are significantly 
lower in the fall. 
The cross-section/time-series model 
finds that women have higher costs. This 
model also indicates that Medicare costs 
decline with age until age 65 and then 
increase monotonically until age 85. We 
additionally find that costs are significant-
ly lower for persons whose race is neither 
black nor white. Although we find, as 
expected, that Medicare costs are sub-
Table 4 
Estimated Medigap Impacts on Medicare Program Costs, 
Using the Fixed-Effects Model, by State: 1991-94 
State 
Alabama 
Arizona 
California 
Florida 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Texas 
Wisconsin 
Average 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
**0.179 
*0.127 
**0.225 
**0.220 
0.080 
**0.185 
0.071 
**0.195 
*0.260 
**0.148 
**0.231 
NA 
Standard 
Error 
0.024 
0.055 
0.011 
0.016 
0.092 
0.025 
0.037 
0.031 
0.092 
0.025 
0.046 
— 
Estimated 
Effect 
(in Percent) 
19.6 
13.5 
25.2 
24.6 
8.3 
20.3 
7.4 
21.5 
29.6 
15.9 
26.0 
19.0 
95-Percent 
Confidence 
Level 
14.0, 25.2 
1.3,25.8 
22.5, 27.9 
20.7, 28.5 
NS 
14.4, 26.2 
NS 
14.2, 28.9 
6.3, 53.1 
10.3,21.6 
14.6, 37.3 
15.8, 22.7 
* Significant at 0.05 level. 
** Significant at 0.01 level. 
NOTES: NA = not applicable. NS = not significant. A positive sign indicates that medigap increases Medicare costs. 
SOURCE: Analysis of Medicare Part A and Part B claims data, 1991-94. 
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Table 5 
Cross-Section/Time-Series and Fixed-Effects Full Model Results for California: 1991-94 
Variable 
Intercept 
MEDIGAP 
SELECT 
EVER 
QUARTER 
SPRING 
SUMMER 
FALL 
FEMALE 
BLACK 
OTHER 
DISABLED 
RENAL 
AGED DIS 
AGED REN 
AGED65 
AGED70 
AGED75 
AGED80 
AGED85 
AGEDGT85 
County Variables 
Insurer Variables 
Adjusted R2 
N 
Cross-Section/ 
Time-Series 
**4.999 
**0.267 
**-0.100 
**0.613 
**0.028 
**0.048 
0.012 
-0.011 
**0.130 
-0.032 
**-0.495 
**1.214 
**4.272 
**-0.308 
**-0.827 
**-0.021 
**0.092 
**0.067 
**0.062 
**0.025 
0.000 
NR 
NR 
0.053 
— 
Standard 
Error 
0.142 
0.012 
0.012 
0.013 
0.001 
0.008 
0.008 
0.008 
0.006 
0.026 
— 
0.030 
0.077 
0.032 
0.092 
0.002 
0.002 
0.003 
0.004 
0.005 
0.004 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Fixed-Effects 
— 
**0.224 
**-0.086 
— 
**0.049 
**0.044 
0.007 
*-0.014 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0.428 
872,880 
Standard 
Error 
— 
0.011 
0.011 
— 
0.001 
0.007 
0.007 
0.007 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
872,880 
* Significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 evel. 
NOTE: NR = not reported. 
SOURCE: Analysis of Medicare Part A and Part B claims data, 1991-94. 
stantially higher for the disabled and those 
with renal disease, we also find that such 
beneficiaries are relatively less expensive 
when also entitled by reason of age. 
Other Cost and Utilization Measures 
The previous discussion focuses on 
results obtained with our most compre-
hensive cost measure, which is total allow-
able Medicare cost. However, we also 
investigated the effects of SELECT on 13 
additional dependent variables measuring 
less comprehensive cost and utilization 
outcomes (Tables 6, 7, and 8). These com-
ponent results help to validate and explain 
the more inclusive cost results 
Table 6 reports the SELECT coefficient 
estimates for various Part B cost mea-
sures; Table 7 reports the estimates for 
total Medicare costs by setting; and Table 
8 reports the estimates for selected utiliza-
tion measures. These are the actual coeffi-
cients estimated from the model, not esti-
mates of the percentage effect.5 Table 9 
provides supplemental information on hos-
pital admissions. We now consider the pat-
tern of results for each study State. 
Alabama 
Consistent with our estimate of a signif-
icant, positive (cost-increasing) effect on 
total Medicare costs, we obtain signifi-
cant, cost-increasing estimates on 
SELECT for all seven component cost 
measures (primary care physician [PCP], 
5 Remember that the cost models were estimated as log-linear 
relationships, and the utilization models were estimated as lin-
ear relationships. Thus, the SELECT coefficient estimates 
obtained in the cost models indicate the effect on the logarithm 
of costs, and the estimates obtained in the utilization models 
indicate the effect on the utilization measure itself (e.g., number 
of visits). 
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specialty physician, ancillary services, 
total Part B, physician office, outpatient 
department, and inpatient hospital) 
included in Tables 6 and 7. Moreover, our 
results indicate that SELECT is associated 
with both increased ambulatory costs and 
increased inpatient costs. In Table 8, 
which reports the SELECT effect on uti-
lization measures, we find only that 
SELECT is associated with a greater 
office visit intensity. The SELECT variable 
is not significant in any of the three inpa-
tient utilization models. This prompts us 
to ask, "How can SELECT increase inpa-
tient costs without also increasing inpa-
tient use?" Table 9 suggests an answer. 
For the SELECT and non-SELECT hos-
pital admissions in each State, Table 9 
shows (1) the average diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) case-mix weight, (2) the 
percentage admitted to a teaching hospi-
tal, and (3) the percentage in a dispropor-
tionate-share hospital. For Alabama we 
observe no difference in the average 
case-mix weights, and we find that a 
somewhat lesser percentage of SELECT 
patients are admitted to disproportionate-
share hospitals. However, we also find 
that a substantially greater percentage of 
SELECT patients are admitted to teach-
ing hospitals—43 percent of SELECT 
patients compared with 33 percent of non-
SELECT patients. Inasmuch as Medicare 
pays teaching hospitals additionally for 
direct and indirect medical education 
costs, otherwise similar patients (e.g., 
ones with the same DRG case weight) 
admitted to a teaching hospital are more 
costly. 
Arizona 
We already reported that SELECT 
increased Medicare costs in Arizona. The 
results in Table 6 suggest that specialist 
and associated ancillary service costs are 
increased. Although no significant cost 
effects are seen in Table 7, significant, 
utilization-increasing coefficient esti-
mates are obtained for all three ambula-
tory utilization measures in Table 8. 
In Table 9 we see that Arizona SELECT 
patients are both less likely to be admit-
ted to a teaching hospital (20 percent 
compared with 42 percent) and less likely 
to be admitted to a disproportionate-
share hospital (17 percent compared with 
46 percent). Thus, SELECT patients are 
Table 6 
Coefficient Estimates for SELECT Effects on Medicare Part B Costs, by State: 1991-94 
State 
Alabama 
Arizona 
California 
Florida 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Texas 
Wisconsin 
Primary Care 
Physician 
**0.117 
NS 
**-0.025 
**0.039 
NS 
NS 
NS 
**-0.066 
*-0.142 
**0.110 
**0.234 
Specialty 
Physician 
**0.113 
**0.188 
**-0.082 
NS 
**0.350 
NS 
NS 
**-0.085 
NS 
NS 
**0.127 
Ancillary 
Services 
**0.133 
*0.114 
**-0.032 
**-0.044 
**0.279 
**0.056 
NS 
*-0.054 
**-0.233 
NS 
NS 
Total Part B 
**0.155 
**0.137 
**-0.081 
NS 
**0.316 
NS 
NS 
**-0.097 
*-0.172 
*0.054 
**0.153 
* Significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 evel. 
NOTES: NS = not significant. A positive coefficient indicates that SELECT increases costs; a negative coefficient indicates that SELECT decreases 
costs. 
SOURCE: Analysis of Medicare Part A and Part B claims data, 1991-94. 
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Table 7 
Coefficient Estimates for SELECT Effects on Medicare Costs, by Setting and State: 1991-94 
State 
Alabama 
Arizona 
California 
Florida 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Texas 
Wisconsin 
Physician 
Office 
**0.108 
NS 
**-0.038 
NS 
*0.151 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
**0.050 
**0.238 
Outpatient 
Department 
**0.074 
NS 
**-0.054 
**-0.063 
**0.374 
NS 
NS 
**-0.104 
NS 
**0.089 
NS 
Inpatient 
Hospital 
**0.070 
NS 
NS 
NS 
**0.299 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
**0.078 
NS 
* Significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 evel. 
NOTES: NS = not significant. A positive coefficient indicates that SELECT increases costs; a negative coefficient indicates that SELECT decreases costs. 
SOURCE: Analysis of Medicare Part A and Part B claims data, 1991-94. 
being admitted to less costly hospitals. 
We also see from Table 9 that the 
SELECT patients have a somewhat high-
er case-mix index, 1.63 compared with 
1.45. This could suggest that Arizona 
SELECT plans have enrolled a less favor-
able risk (i.e., patients requiring more 
costly, higher intensity care). The fixed-
effects procedure controls for such dif-
ferences in estimating SELECT effects to 
the extent that the risk-profile differ-
ences existed prior to SELECT enroll-
ment. 
California 
Our results indicate that Medicare is 
saving money on SELECT in California. 
The supplemental results in Tables 6 and 
7 suggest that the cost savings are com-
ing entirely from ambulatory care. Both 
physician office and hospital outpatient 
department (OPD) costs are reduced, 
and the costs are reduced for PCPs, spe-
cialists, and ancillary services. The OPD 
utilization measure (Table 8) also elicits 
a significant, negative coefficient. Finally, 
as seen in Table 9, the characteristics of 
SELECT and non-SELECT hospital 
admissions in California are similar. 
Florida 
Although a negative coefficient was 
obtained, SELECT is not estimated to sig-
nificantly reduce total Medicare costs in 
Florida. Nevertheless, as in California, it 
appears that any Florida cost savings are 
coming from ambulatory care. Our results 
indicate that physician visit rates are sig-
nificantly reduced (Table 8), and that OPD 
and ancillary costs are significantly lower 
(Tables 6 and 7). Although we also obtain a 
negative estimate for the impact on physi-
cian office costs, this estimate is not signif-
icant. On the other hand, our results indi-
cate that PCP costs are increased. No 
effect on inpatient costs is shown. 
A modestly lower percentage of 
SELECT patients in Florida are admitted 
to teaching hospitals and a modestly high-
er percentage are admitted to dispropor-
tionate-share hospitals (Table 9). The 
average case-mix weights are virtually 
identical for the two groups. 
Indiana 
Although the sample size for Indiana is 
small compared with 9 of the other 10 
States, we nevertheless estimate that 
SELECT has a significant and sizable cost-
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increasing effect in this State. With the 
exception of PCP costs, we obtain signifi-
cant, positive coefficients for all cost mea-
sures included in Tables 6 and 7. 
In Indiana 15 percent of the SELECT 
enrollees had been disenrolled from an 
HMO, compared with only 1.6 percent of 
non-SELECT enrollees. If the HMO disen-
rollees were not only sicker than average 
but also getting sicker at a disproportion-
ate rate, our estimation would attribute a 
positive cost impact to SELECT. 
Comparatively little is known, however, 
about the health status or health-status 
progression of HMO disenrollees. In other 
SELECT States, except Wisconsin, we do 
not observe similar imbalance in the 
distribution of HMO disenrollees across 
SELECT and non-SELECT groups. 
In Wisconsin, however, the situation was 
qualitatively different. A staff-model HMO 
converted its entire Medicare risk program 
to SELECT. Thus selection bias should be a 
less important factor in that State. 
Kentucky and Minnesota 
In both Kentucky and Minnesota, we 
detected no significant effects on overall 
Medicare costs. Those results are general-
ly mirrored by other findings reported in 
Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9. In Kentucky we find 
that, although ancillary costs are 
increased, utilization is shifted toward 
more cost-effective settings. The OPD visit 
rate is reduced, but the office visit rate and 
the ambulatory surgery rate are increased. 
SELECT patients in Kentucky are much 
less likely to use a disproportionate-share 
hospital—25 percent of SELECT admis-
sions compared with 53 percent of non-
SELECT admissions. SELECT patients are 
also less likely to use a teaching hospital. 
For Minnesota none of the cost mea-
sures in Tables 6 and 7 elicits a significant 
coefficient. We find only that inpatient 
days are significantly increased. Moreover, 
SELECT patients are somewhat more 
likely to use disproportionate-share hospi-
tals (Table 9). 
Missouri 
SELECT is estimated to reduce overall 
Medicare costs in Missouri. Our results in 
Table 6 indicate a consistent pattern of 
Part B cost reductions associated with 
SELECT. Tables 7 and 8, however, suggest 
that the cost savings are coming largely 
from the hospital outpatient department. 
This finding is not surprising, given that all 
three SELECT insurers in Missouri use 
hospital-only networks, which would only 
suggest a potential change in hospital use 
and cost. No impact on inpatient costs is 
measured, despite a somewhat greater use 
of teaching hospitals (54 percent of 
SELECT admissions compared with 43 
percent of non-SELECT admissions). 
Ohio 
We estimate that overall Medicare costs 
are reduced for SELECT enrollees in Ohio. 
Our component cost estimates suggest 
that the savings are achieved on primary 
care and ancillary services (Table 6). 
Although a negative coefficient was also 
obtained for physician office costs (Table 
7), the estimate is not quite significant. 
We find that inpatient days are signifi-
cantly reduced, which should imply 
reduced inpatient costs. However, no sig-
nificant effect on inpatient costs is indicat-
ed (Table 7). Table 9 shows that the 
SELECT patients are both somewhat less 
likely to use teaching hospitals and sub-
stantially more likely to use disproportion-
ate-share hospitals. Evidently the inpatient 
utilization reductions are offset by higher 
reimbursement rates. Although it should 
not affect the estimation, we additionally 
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Table 8 
Coefficient Estimates for SELECT Effects on Medicare Costs, 
Using Selected Utilization Measures, by State: 1991-94 
State 
Alabama 
Arizona 
California 
Florida 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Texas 
Wisconsin 
Office 
Visits 
**0.080 
**0.115* 
NS 
NS 
NS 
*0.032 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
Outpatient 
Department 
Visits 
NS 
*0.053 
**-0.019 
**-0.033 
**0.085 
**-0.020 
NS 
**-0.056 
NS 
NS 
NS 
Ambulatory 
Surgeries 
NS 
**0.029 
NS 
NS 
NS 
*0.068 
NS 
NS 
NS 
*-0.031 
NS 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
*0.003 
NS 
Inpatient 
Days 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
*0.046 
NS 
**-0.233 
*0.045 
NS 
Inpatient 
Surgeries 
NS 
NS 
**0.0087 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
* Significant at 0.05 level. 
** Significant at 0.01 level. 
NOTES: NS = not significant. A positive coefficient indicates that SELECT increases utilization; a negative coefficient indicates that SELECT 
decreases utilization. 
SOURCE: Analysis of Medicare Part A and Part B claims data, 1991-94. 
note that the average case-mix weight for 
SELECT admissions in Ohio is slightly high-
er than that for non-SELECT admissions. 
Texas 
As found in the aggregate, the Texas 
results for component measures provide 
fairly consistent evidence that SELECT has 
increased Medicare costs. We obtain signifi-
cant, positive estimates for all cost measures 
in Table 7. Moreover, the utilization results 
indicate that inpatient admissions and inpa-
tient days are significantly increased. Only 
the ambulatory surgery rate is significantly 
lower (Table 8), perhaps signaling a shift to 
inpatient surgery. Inpatient costs are signifi-
cantly higher despite the fact that SELECT 
patients are substantially less likely to be 
admitted to a teaching hospital (19 percent 
of SELECT admissions compared with 30 
percent of non-SELECT admissions). 
Wisconsin 
In Wisconsin SELECT was estimated to 
increase aggregate Medicare costs. In 
Tables 6 and 7, we find evidence for cost-
increasing effects only in the physician 
office setting. No effects on OPD or inpa-
tient costs are indicated. Moreover PCP and 
specialty physician costs are both increased, 
as are total Part B costs. However, we do not 
find in Table 8 that the office visit rate is sig-
nificantly increased. Wisconsin's SELECT 
patients are less likely to use teaching hospi-
tals, but there is no difference in the use of 
disproportionate-share hospitals or the aver-
age case-mix weights. 
On balance we believe that these supple-
mental analyses, using other cost and uti-
lization measures, give results that are 
broadly consistent with our overall cost find-
ings and significantly validate those results. 
We also suggest, based on the supplemental 
analyses, that the cost factors are different in 
different States. There seems not to be any 
simple explanation for either increased or 
reduced costs under SELECT. Like SELECT 
itself, the dynamic seems to vary by State. 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis gives undeniably mixed 
results, with the estimated effects varying 
substantially by State. Five States show cost 
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Table 9 
Hospital and Case-mix Characteristics for SELECT and Non-SELECT Admissions, by State: 1993 
State 
Alabama 
Arizona 
California 
Florida 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Texas 
Wisconsin 
Percentage in 
Teaching Hospital1 
SELECT 
42.9 
20.4 
29.6 
29.0 
15.5 
43.0 
44.0 
53.7 
64.1 
19.4 
66.1 
Non-SELECT 
32.5 
41.8 
30.4 
32.0 
19.4 
48.8 
45.1 
43.2 
72.6 
29.8 
76.3 
Percentage in 
Disproportionate-
Share Hospital1 
SELECT 
59.6 
17.0 
58.3 
43.6 
80.4 
24.8 
18.5 
8.0 
68.9 
59.9 
26.0 
Non-SELECT 
66.5 
46.3 
58.6 
41.6 
88.2 
52.9 
13.4 
14.6 
38.4 
53.8 
27.6 
DRG 
Case-mix Weight 
SELECT 
1.45 
1.63 
1.60 
1.57 
1.45 
1.48 
1.48 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.57 
Non-SELECT 
1.45 
1.45 
1.59 
1.54 
1.66 
1.47 
1.46 
1.47 
1.42 
1.43 
1.56 
1Based on prospective payment system impact file (1993). 
NOTE: DRG is diagnosis-related group. 
SOURCE: Analysis of Medicare Part A claims data, 1993. 
increases; three States show cost decreas-
es; and three States show no effect. 
Moreover we see no obvious patterns in 
the SELECT implementations that would 
explain the variation in findings across 
States. California, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin are all reasonably mature man-
aged care States. One of these States 
(California) shows a cost decrease, one 
State (Wisconsin) shows a cost increase, 
and one State (Minnesota) shows no 
effect. All SELECT insurers in Indiana, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and Texas use 
hospital-only provider networks. Two of 
these States (Indiana and Texas) show 
cost increases; two (Missouri and Ohio) 
show cost decreases; and one (Kentucky) 
shows no effect. SELECT products were 
based on pre-OBRA network products in 
Alabama, California, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin. Two of these States (Alabama 
and Wisconsin) show cost increases, one 
(California) shows a cost decrease, and 
one (Minnesota) shows no effect. 
Although significant inpatient effects 
were indicated in three States (Alabama, 
Indiana, and Texas), we find that the cost 
effects more consistently reflect differences 
in ambulatory care costs. The estimated 
effects on physician office costs are signifi-
cant in 5 of the 11 study States; and the esti-
mated effects on OPD costs are significant 
in 6 States. 
In general, we believe that our fixed-
effects results reflect actual SELECT pro-
gram effects and cannot be easily attributed 
to either selection or specification biases. 
We do not, however, preclude the prospect 
that biases of one kind or another have 
skewed our estimates in one or more States. 
In particular we are concerned that we did 
not know the medigap insurance status of 
beneficiaries prior to purchase of their cur-
rent policy. We are also concerned that the 
estimates for Indiana do not reflect true 
SELECT program effects because the effect 
is so large and the rate of transfer from 
Medicare HMOs is so much higher among 
SELECT beneficiaries than among com-
parison group members. On the other 
hand, we think it unlikely that analytic bias-
es could explain the overall pattern of 
results. Indeed the mixed nature of our 
findings tends to make the estimates all the 
more credible, because it is difficult to 
posit any other explanation. 
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The original premise of SELECT had 
been that it would reduce aggregate health 
care costs because SELECT insurers would 
have an incentive to establish cost-effective 
provider networks and then support the 
networks in improving health system effi-
ciency. The case study found that, as imple-
mented by most insurers, SELECT is a 
comparatively weak form of managed care 
(Lubalin et al., 1994). Many SELECT insur-
ers do not include physicians in their 
provider networks, choosing instead to 
recruit hospitals that discount or waive the 
Part A deductible and to cover the Part B 
deductible and coinsurance for any physi-
cian that the beneficiary decides to use. 
Most insurers that use physician networks 
organize them as preferred provider net-
works without gatekeepers, again, a rela-
tively weak form of managed care. Thus, on 
the basis of the case study, we had antici-
pated finding little, if any, effect of SELECT 
on utilization or costs. 
How then does one account for the find-
ing that the SELECT plans in several States 
have apparently increased health care 
costs? What are the potential mechanisms 
for affecting such cost increases? We offer 
three potential explanations. 
Like some PPOs, some SELECT plans 
may have contracted with providers on a 
discounted-fee basis and not given suffi-
cient attention to managing the overall effi-
ciency of health care services. In some 
PPOs the providers simply recouped their 
discounts by providing or billing more ser-
vices. In other instances the PPOs had, in 
contracting on a percentage discount basis, 
unwittingly selected the more costly 
providers (i.e., the ones with greater mar-
gins and thus greater flexibility to accept a 
discount). Whatever the mechanism, 
employers found that the PPOs were actu-
ally costing them more, much as we are 
finding with regard to the SELECT experi-
ence in several States. 
The possibility that SELECT insurers 
unwittingly chose more expensive 
providers may explain why SELECT influ-
enced physician costs in Indiana, Missouri, 
Ohio, and Texas, even though none of the 
SELECT networks in those States include 
physicians. The physicians associated with 
the SELECT network hospitals may be sys-
tematically more or less expensive than 
other physicians used by the comparison 
population. We encountered no evidence 
that the ambulatory utilization patterns of 
physicians affiliated with network hospitals 
were considered by insurers when they 
developed hospital-only networks. 
However, such differences could explain 
the impact of hospital-only SELECT plans 
on physician costs, if SELECT beneficia-
ries were more likely to use physicians 
affiliated with hospitals in their SELECT 
network. If this pattern occurred by 
chance rather than by design, we would 
expect to see a cost-increasing impact in 
some cases (e.g., Indiana and Texas) and a 
cost-decreasing impact in others (e.g., 
Missouri and Ohio), as we have found. 
Finally, in Wisconsin, a predominantly 
rural State, the increased costs might arise 
as a result of SELECT's role in improving 
health care access. In many rural and other 
underserved areas, Medicare risk-con-
tracting HMOs have found that they are 
unwilling or unable to provide Medicare 
services within the adjusted average per 
capita cost experience-based capitation. 
They argue that access barriers have 
impeded health care use by the FFS popu-
lation and left traditional Medicare benefi-
ciaries with untreated or inadequately 
treated problems. They further argue that 
beneficiaries who join a multispecialty 
HMO receive more intensive and expen-
sive treatment than they otherwise would 
have received from community providers 
under FFS Medicare. Consequently, the 
costs of care provided to SELECT benefi-
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ciaries by HMO physicians are higher than 
the costs for comparison beneficiaries 
served by non-HMO community physi-
cians. If, as the HMOs contend, this pattern 
reflects poor access among rural Medicare 
beneficiaries not served by HMOs, the 
higher costs may be justifiable. On the 
other hand, if the difference arises as a 
result of multispecialty physicians deliver-
ing unnecessarily intensive care, the higher 
costs are not justified. In Wisconsin more 
than one-half of the SELECT beneficiaries 
came from three staff-type HMOs that had 
terminated their risk arrangements with 
Medicare because they perceived that they 
could not afford to provide care on a com-
munity-rated basis. This is consistent with 
a hypothesis that the SELECT beneficiaries 
served by these HMOs receive more inten-
sive treatment than comparison beneficia-
ries living in the same areas, although it 
does not address the question of whether 
the greater intensity is desirable. 
A fourth possible explanation, namely, 
the hypothesis that SELECT products 
increase costs in some States by increasing 
use of high-cost teaching and dispropor-
tionate-share hospitals, is not consistently 
supported. Higher inpatient hospital costs 
were associated with higher total costs in 
only three of the five cost-increasing States 
(Alabama, Indiana, and Texas). Only in 
Alabama were higher inpatient hospital 
costs associated with greater use of teach-
ing and disproportionate-share hospitals. 
In Indiana and Texas, higher hospital costs 
were associated with lesser use of teaching 
and disproportionate-share hospitals. 
Much as Mathematica found in evaluat-
ing the early Medicare risk contracts 
(Brown et al., 1993), we find evidence that 
the early implementations of SELECT (in 
some instances) have actually increased 
Medicare program costs. It is possible that 
as SELECT matures, the successful efforts 
of some plans may be emulated by others, 
and SELECT may contribute to a reduction 
in Medicare program costs. The SELECT 
model first anticipated by Congress, in 
which insurers select efficient networks of 
physicians and hospitals, may offer the best 
opportunity for program savings. However, 
on a demonstration basis, SELECT has 
not consistently resulted in savings. 
Furthermore, most of the insurers recently 
entering the SELECT market have adopted 
the hospital-only network model (Han et al., 
1996), which offers less potential for savings. 
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